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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 
Current European Union (EU) policy documents related to employment and labour market 
issues often emphasise the future challenge of a more diverse workforce within the EU as a 
consequence of increased mobility and migration. Indeed, even the recent economic crisis has 
not induced much change in mobility (apart from the fact that outflow from the 
Mediterranean EU member states increased due to serious recession there). Although the 
inflow of workers from the 10 “new member states” may have been reduced to some extent 
into several member states, as is pointed out by a recent research,
1
 no mass return happened. 
It is remarkable, however, that future enlargements and its potential impacts are hardly 
mentioned within this context. This is all the more striking since Croatia already joined the 
EU in mid-2013 and, as has been emphasised by another document on future enlargements, 
the country’s accession could be regarded as the first step towards a series of accessions of 
other countries in the Western Balkans region. 
If the labour market in an enlarged economic area is seen not just as the total of labour 
markets of the constituent member states but rather as an entity itself in its complexity, where 
interactions and relationships matter, one of the major issues is labour mobility. As can be 
clearly seen nowadays, further enlargement could raise many issues and challenges from this 
point of view. Although the free movement of workers is one of the basic principles of the 
EU, it seems likely that initially restrictions would remain in place for a certain period (this 
usually lasted seven years during the previous rounds of accessions of less developed 
countries). This is all the more likely since many of the (potential) candidates have a recent 
history of large labour outflow precisely to some of the EU member states (the most notable 
example is Turkey). In addition, as has already been the case, there are large differences 
between the average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the current EU member 
states and most of the countries which are to join the EU later.  
As a background for constructing a theoretical model of the EU36, this study aims to 
focus on those key factors which have the potential to strongly influence future labour 
mobility developments. Therefore, first the situation in the potential member states will be 
analysed on the basis of macroeconomic, demographic and labour market indicators. In the 
second part of the study, experiences of the previous, most recent enlargements (in 2004 and 
                                                          
1
 See Eurofound, Labour mobility within the EU: The impact of return migration (Dublin: Eurofound – 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2012). 
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2007) will be outlined with special regard to possible lessons and implications for future 
enlargements. 
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CHAPTER 2 – ECONOMIC CONTEXT  
 
2.1 Income Differentials  
 
From the point of view of potential future mobility, an analysis of income differentials is of 
high importance, since this could be a key factor behind high motivation for moving to 
another country. Although in the case of Croatia, the income differential from the EU average 
is more or less equal to Hungary and in its order of magnitude the situation in Turkey seems 
comparable to that of Bulgaria and Romania, in other countries the GDP in purchasing parity 
standard is much lower than the EU average: in Macedonia* and Serbia it is just slightly 
higher than one third of the average, whereas in Bosnia it is lower, and the lowest can be 
found in Albania, where it is just slightly higher than one quarter of the EU average. 
Table 2.1: Income differentials, as reflected in GDP purchasing power standard (PPS). (Index, EU27 
= 100). 
 
Countries 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Bulgaria 38 40 44 44 44 
Germany 115 116 116 116 118 
Hungary 63 62 64 65 65 
Romania 38 42 47 47 46 
Montenegro 36 40 43 41 41° 
Croatia 58 61 64 64 61 
Macedonia* 30 31 34 36 36 
Serbia 32 33 36 36 35 
Turkey 45 46 47 46 49 
Albania 23 23 26 28 28 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
27 28 30 31 31 
Source: Eurostat.  
°: Provisional data. 
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Although income differentials are important when analysing migration potential (and 
help in explaining past and current mobility trends – see, for example, the section on 
experiences of the most recent enlargements), this cannot be regarded as the only influential 
factor. Political and economic developments and stability, both in the sending and the 
previous migration patterns (so-called network migration) and other factors (such as costs of 
migration) also play a prominent role. Among these factors, the next section focuses on 
recent economic developments and possible prospects. 
 
2.2 Recent Economic Developments with Special Regard to the Crisis  
 
Economic development in most of the countries (i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia*, Montenegro and Serbia) is restrained by their low export capacity, and 
this is reflected in their high trade deficits. “Current accounts displayed marked deterioration 
in the period prior to the crisis in two economies: Montenegro and Serbia. Most of the 
countries in the group rely on major transfers in the form of remittances from their nationals 
living and working abroad, thus partly offsetting the high trade deficit.”2 The most well 
known example of this is Albania (but in Serbia this moderating effect is also considerable). 
In addition, some of the countries are struggling with twin deficit since their budget deficit is 
at quite a high level, being around 5 per cent (e.g. in Croatia and Serbia, despite all previous 
efforts of fiscal prudence, watched by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and Albania). 
This has the potential of further exacerbating the debt position of these countries.
3
 
It is understandable that after the crisis broke out, almost all the countries recorded a 
negative GDP growth rate (with the exception of Albania and Kosovo*, but even in these 
countries it became much lower than before, being 3.3 per cent and 2.9 per cent in 2009, as 
against 7.5 per cent and 6.9 per cent in 2008, respectively).
4
 Their GDP, however, fell by 
varying degrees, and in some countries at least certain signs of recovery could be observed 
from 2010, for example in Macedonia* and Bosnia, as well as in Montenegro, where GDP 
fell by 5.7 per cent in 2009, but grew by 2.5 per cent in 2010.
5
 Although the crisis also hit 
                                                          
2
 Vasily Astrov et al., New Divide(s) in Europe? WIIW Current Analyses and Forecasts No. 9 (Vienna: Wiener 
Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche [Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies], 2012)., 
p.7 
3
 Ibid., 28. 
4
 Source for Albania: ibid, 23. For Kosovo*: The World Bank, IMF, SIPRI, quoted by Bertelsmann, 2012 p. 16. 
5
Source: Bertelsmann, 2012, Country Report Montenegro. p. 17 
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Turkey, this is the only country where a remarkable recovery could be observed: here already 
in the second quarter of 2009 an economic recovery was registered, which further developed, 
leading to a not less than 9 per cent growth. According to analysts, “this is due to an 
impressive package of fiscal consolidation and institutional reform”, which “has continued to 
have a positive impact on economic growth.”6 
As regards most of the countries of the region, however, the growth prospects in the 
short term (within the next one or two years) do not seem to be promising: in view of the 
continuing crisis in the Eurozone, especially in nearby Greece and other southern European 
countries, the export prospects are weak and there are no signs of other factors which could 
help further recovery. 
                                                          
6
See ibid., country study on Turkey, 12. 
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CHAPTER 3 – SOME DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES AND LABOUR MARKET TRENDS  
 
3.1 Demographic Features  
 
As an introduction to the topic, it is worth having an overview of some basic data relating to 
population and demographic developments. 
Table 3.1: Population, population growth, life expectancy and share of urban population in countries 
of the region, 2012°. 
 
Countries Population 
(million) 
Population growth (%, 
per annum) 
Life expectancy 
at birth (years)
 a
 
Share of urban 
population (%) 
Albania 3.2 0.3 77 54.4 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
3.8 -0.1 76
 
 48.8 
Croatia 4.3 -0.3 77
 
 58.1
 a
 
Kosovo* 1.8 0.9 70
 
 : 
Macedonia* 2.1 0.1 75 59.4 
Montenegro 0.6 0.1 75 63.5 
Serbia 7.2 -0.5 75 56.7 
Turkey 74.0 1.3 75 72.3 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2013. 
°Unless otherwise indicated. a: 2011 
 
In terms of population size, the pattern is heterogeneous: five countries can be 
regarded as rather small (Kosovo*, Macedonia*, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), two are medium-size (Croatia and Serbia) and Turkey is very large, 
comparable in size among the current EU members with Germany, the biggest EU country. 
As regards life expectancy, however, which ranges from 75 to 77 years (with the exception of 
Kosovo*), the countries constitute a more homogeneous group, being similar to the general 
European pattern. There is, however, some variation in population growth, which is the 
highest in Turkey and Kosovo*.  
Although, as could be seen, income differentials are large compared to the EU 
average, some other key demographic indicators also show similar patterns to the EU 
average, or to those of some current member states. As regards total fertility rates, it exceeds 
the level of simple reproduction (2.1) in Kosovo* only. Otherwise, it is in Turkey that the 
level is the closest but even here there is a clear declining tendency (see Table 3.2). 
 
9 
 
Table 3.2: Total fertility rates. 
 
Countries 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
EU27 1.50 1.51 1.54 1.56 1.61 1.60 1.61 1.57 : 
Bulgaria 1.29 1.32 1.38 1.49 1.56 1.60 1.57 1.51 1.50 
Croatia 1.43 1.50 1.47 1.48 1.55 1.58 1.55 1.48 1.51 
Hungary 1.28 1.31 1.34 1.32 1.35 1.32 1.25 1.26 1.34° 
Romania 1.35 1.39 1.40 1.42 1.53 1.57 1.54 1.46 1.53 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
1.21 1.20 1.20 1.21 1.22 1.23 1.24 1.26 : 
Kosovo* 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 : 
Macedonia* 1.52 1.46 1.46 1.46 1.47 1.52 1.56 1.46 1.51 
Montenegro 
: 1.60 1.63 1.69 1.77 1.85 1.69 1.65 1.71 
Turkey : : : : 2.10 2.09 2.04 2.03 2.09 
Albania 2.00 1.90 1.85 1.79 1.76 1.74 1.74 1.75 : 
Serbia 1.57 1.45 1.43 1.38 1.40 1.44 1.40 1.40 1.45 
Sources: Eurostat, and for Kosovo*, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators. 
: No data available. °: Break in time series. 
 
In some cases this may be due to considerable previous emigration, as a consequence 
of which the age composition of the population is unfavourable from a demographic point of 
view: the share of children and young people is low. However, there are countries where 
despite the low fertility rate nowadays (and large emigration), the age composition remained 
relatively favourable (due to a higher fertility rate before). For example, in Albania the share 
of the young population is still high (21 per cent), similarly to Montenegro (19 per cent) – see 
Table 3.3. (Although the pattern of development is similar among the listed member states, 
low fertility rates cannot be attributed in all cases to emigration, but rather to a long-standing 
tendency of natural decrease of the population – in Hungary for example, this started already 
about 30 years ago). 
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Despite the time lag between current fertility rate and the age composition, as is clear 
from Table 3.3, the share in the population of the youngest age group shows a more or less 
similar pattern (quite understandably), but from a different angle. The figure is highest in 
Kosovo* in this case, too. The share of the youngest population is actually lower than the EU 
average in Serbia and Croatia (even if by just two and one percentage point, respectively), 
and they show the lowest figures among those countries (in Table 3.3) where there are 
comparable data available. The population growth is negative in both countries (being -0.5 
and -0.3, respectively – see Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.3: Share of population of less than 15 years of age. 
 
Country 
group/countries 
2013 
% 
EU27+  16 
Bulgaria 14 
Hungary 14 
Romania 16 
Montenegro 19 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina++ 
16 
Croatia 15 
Albania++ 21 
Kosovo*+++ 27 
Macedonia* 17 
Serbia 14 
Turkey 25 
Source: For Albania, Kosovo* and Bosnia and Herzegovina: World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. For all the other countries: Eurostat. 
+: Provisional data. ++: 2012 data. +++: 2010 data. 
 
To sum up, considering recent demographic developments, the potential member 
states have to face the same or very similar challenges as the current members: an ageing 
population, low fertility rates which, in most cases, do not reach the level needed for simple 
11 
 
replacement, etc. Therefore, the demographic pattern of these countries cannot be compared 
to that of the developing countries and this is also true for Turkey, even if its pattern is 
slightly different. Relating this to the focus of this paper, i.e. the development of the future 
labour market in an enlarged economic area, migration potential from these countries is an 
important issue, but the potential depends not only on demographic factors but also on many 
other elements, such as political and economic stability, and within the context of the latter, 
labour market developments, migration history, i.e. previous emigration patterns, as well as 
the political and economic circumstances of the host countries, etc. Among these, the next 
section focuses on some indicators reflecting recent labour market developments. 
 
3.2 Labour Market Trends: Employment, Unemployment and Economic Activity  
 
When looking at trends, the employment rate is certainly one of the most important 
indicators, showing how the labour market reacted to the crisis. 
12 
 
Table 3.4: Employment rates in selected EU member states and in potential member countries (employed persons as a percentage of working age population, 
i.e. 15-64 years). 
 
Country 
group/ 
Countries 
2007 2008 2009 2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
Total Male Female Total Male  Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male  Female Total Male  Female  
EU27 65.3 72.5 58.2 65.8 72.7 58.9 64.5 70.7 58.4 64.1 70.1 58.2 
64.2 70.1 58.4 64.2 69.8 58.6 
Bulgaria 61.7 66.0 57.6 64.0 68.5 59.5 62.6 66.9 58.3 59.7 63.0 56.4 
58.4 61.2 55.6 58.8 61.3 56.3 
Hungary 57.3 64.0 50.9 56.7 63.0 50.6 55.4 61.1 49.9 55.4 60.4 50.6 
55.8 61.2 50.6 57.2 62.5 52.1 
Romania 58.8 64.8 52.8 59.0 65.7 52.5 58.6 65.2 52.0 58.8 65.7 52.0 
58.5 65.0 52.0 59.5 66.5 52.6 
Iceland 85.1 89.1 80.8 83.6 87.3 79.6 78.3 80.0 76.5 78.2 80.1 76.2 
78.5 80.3 76.6 79.7 81.5 77.8 
Albania
a
 : : : : : : : : : 42.3 51.0 33.5        
Croatia 57.1 64.4 50.0 57.8 65.0 50.7 56.6 62.4 51.0 54.0 59.4 48.8 52.4 57.9 47.0  50.7 55.1 46.2 
Macedonia* 40.7 48.8 32.3 41.9 50.7 32.9 43.3 52.8 33.5 43.5 52.8 34.0 
43.9 52.3 35.3 44.0 52.4 35.3 
Kosovo*
b 
: : : : : : 26.4 40.2 12.6 : : : 
      
Montenegro
c 
: : : : : : : : : 47.6 54.3 41.0       
Serbia
d 
: : : : : : : : : 47.2 : :       
Turkey 44.6 66.8 22.8 44.9 66.6 23.5 44.3 64.5 24.2 46.3 66.7 26.2  48.4 69.2 27.8 48.9 69.2 28.7 
Source: Eurostat, unless otherwise indicated.  
a: Albanian Institute of Statistics. b: Statistical Agency of Kosovo. c: Source: Statistical Office of Montenegro. d: Estimate by the European Commission, in: 
Commission Staff Working Paper, Analytical Report - Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Commission 
Opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European Union, p. 136, Brussels 12.10.2011 SEC(2011) 1208, COM(2011) 668 : No comparable 
data available. 
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Not surprisingly, in all the countries where comparable data are available, the 
employment rate declined in 2009 (with the exception of Macedonia*, where it slightly 
increased; however, in Macedonia*, decrease in GDP was the lowest, being 0.9 per cent only, 
and it quickly recovered by 2010, which may have started already in 2009). What could be 
more worrying, however, especially when the labour market is considered with a view to 
future enlargement, is that the employment rate in general is much lower than the EU average 
in all potential members of the Western Balkans, and in most of them it is even lower than 
the current member states with the lowest employment rate. It is also clear that the crisis even 
deteriorated, for example, the relative position of Croatia later in 2010 (there in 2009 the 
employment rate was higher than in Hungary, whereas by 2010 it did not reach even the 
Hungarian level). In Turkey, however, obviously as a consequence of its quick economic 
recovery, the employment rate has been increasing continuously since 2010; it grew by 4 
percentage points between 2008 and 2012. As can be seen, women’s employment rate varies 
to a large extent: it ranged between 76.5 per cent (Iceland) and 12.6 per cent (Kosovo*) in 
2009. The variation is large even within the region, i.e. among the countries of the Western 
Balkans, being for example 51 per cent in Croatia. This is obviously due to large differences 
in women’s economic activity between the countries concerned (unemployment also matters, 
but to a lesser extent.) If compared to the current EU member states (with the exception of 
Malta), it is precisely in most of these countries that women’s inactivity is the highest: 
according to Eurostat data, the proportion of inactive women of working age exceeds 70 per 
cent in Kosovo*, in Turkey it approaches that level, in Montenegro it is nearly 60 per cent, in 
Macedonia* and Serbia nearly 50 per cent, and it is only in Croatia that women’s inactivity is 
lower than that of Italy, being 46 per cent.
7
 Women’s economic activity is strongly 
determined by the demographic context characterising each country (see just two relevant 
indicators, the total fertility rates and the share of population of less than 15 years of age in 
Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 respectively). There seems to be quite a straightforward relationship 
between women’s economic activity and their willingness to work, which underlines the 
importance of demographic context. As can be seen from Table 3.5, in countries where 
women’s economic activity is high, the willingness of those women, who are inactive, is also 
high. 
Table 3.5: Share of women willing to work among those who are economically inactive. 
                                                          
7
 Cited in Eurofound, Quality of life in enlargement countries. Third European Quality of Life Survey - Croatia 
(Dublin: Eurofound – European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2013), p. 
6. 
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Country group/Countries Share (%) 
Croatia 73 
Iceland 91 
Kosovo* 45 
Macedonia* 65 
Montenegro 62 
Serbia 57 
Turkey 58 
EU27 average 70 
Source: Responses given in the Third European Quality of Life Survey in 2012, Eurofound, 
Quality of life in enlargement countries.  
 
A good example for this is Croatia vs. Kosovo*: in the former, where women’s 
economic activity is relatively high, the majority of inactive women are willing to work, 
whereas this is not the case in Kosovo*, where women’s inactivity level is the lowest in the 
region. The two countries show entirely different demographic features (see Table 3.2 and 
3.3).  
As a consequence of the crisis, unemployment in all countries reached a two-digit 
level, as shown by Table 3.5. It is consistently the highest in Macedonia* – at first sight this 
could be surprising and even contradictory to what was mentioned above (i.e. that the crisis 
did not hit the labour market there as severely as in other countries). As can be seen from 
Table 3.4, however, its employment rate is continuously one of the lowest (only in Kosovo* 
is it lower), being even smaller than in Turkey when it was the worst (in 2009, immediately 
after the crisis). The number of unemployed, being around or sometimes even more than one 
quarter of the labour force, is also very high in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is all the more 
remarkable, since it can be assumed that a large part of the working population is employed 
in agriculture (the majority of population in the country lives in rural areas: see Table 3.1).  
 
Table 3.6: Unemployment rate in the Western Balkans countries and Turkey. Number of unemployed 
in labour force, in percentage. 
 
Countries 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 
15 
 
Croatia 11.6 9.6 8.4 9.1 11.8 13.7 
Macedonia* 36.0 34.9 33.8 32.2 32.0 31.0 
Montenegro 29.6 19.3 17.2 19.3 19.6 20.0 
Turkey 8.8 8.9 9.8 12.7 10.7 9.2 
Albania : 13.5 13.0 13.8 13.7 14.0 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
1
 
31.1 29.0 23.4 24.1 27.2 27.6 
Serbia 20.9 18.1 13.6 16.1 19.2 23.0 
Source: National Labour Force Survey data, cited in Astrov et al. New Divide(s) (WIIW), pp. 106, 
109, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123  
Note: * Estimates by WIIW 
1
 : Data from April of each year. 
 
Apart from general high unemployment, the fact that youth is particularly hard hit is a 
cause for concern: “the youth unemployment rates range between about 35% in Croatia and 
Montenegro, 50% in Serbia and 60% in Bosnia and Herzegovina.”8 Long-term 
unemployment poses another problem in several countries: in Macedonia*, Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. 
We could get a more refined picture about people who are in employment on the basis 
of the European Working Conditions Survey, which was a Europe-wide survey including 
most of the Western Balkans countries conducted in the first half of 2010. As can be seen 
from Table 3.6, the share of self-employed persons is the highest in Albania, where the 
majority of male workers (51 per cent) can be found in this category. In 2005 this figure was 
even higher in Turkey (61.2 per cent), but it dropped to 37.8 per cent by 2010, which could 
still be considered high compared both to the EU and some other countries of the region. This 
share is also conspicuously high in Kosovo*, where almost half of male workers are self-
employed (48.9 per cent). In the case of the former two countries, i.e. Albania and Turkey, 
high self-employment can be assumed to be related to the dominance of agriculture: when the 
sectoral composition of workers is considered it turns out that in both countries the share of 
agriculture is above 20 per cent. 
                                                          
8
 WIIW, 2012, 50. 
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Table 3.7: Employment status in several Western Balkans countries, Turkey, in the EU and groups of 
EU member states on the basis of the European Working Conditions Survey. 
 
 
 
Source: Fifth European Working Conditions Survey, 2010 (Question 6: Are you mainly…?). 
Note: All EU Member States before Eastern enlargements (2004, 2007, respectively), i.e. until 30
th
 of 
April 2004  
** All 27 Member States of European Union as of 2010 
 
In Kosovo*, however, it is the share of the wholesale, retail, food and accommodation 
sector which is the highest, and although the share of self-employed persons is lower in 
Countries and 
Country groups 
2005 2010 
  Employed Self-
employed 
Other N Employed Self-
employed 
Other N 
Croatia Male 81.7% 14.5% 3.8% 447 77.3% 18.0% 4.6% 569 
Female 85.1% 11.8% 3.1% 558 80.8% 11.7% 7.5% 529 
Total 83.2% 13.3% 3.5% 1005 78.9% 15.1% 5.9% 1098 
Macedonia Male 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 67.1% 26.4% 6.5% 669 
Female 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 77.5% 17.6% 5.0% 428 
Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 71.1% 23.0% 5.9% 1097 
Turkey Male 37.7% 61.2% 1.1% 850 62.1% 37.8% 0.1% 1582 
Female 62.0% 36.3% 1.7% 163 66.4% 33.4% 0.2% 518 
Total 44.2% 54.6% 1.3% 1013 63.3% 36.6% 0.1% 2100 
Albania Male 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 48.3% 51.0% 0.7% 636 
Female 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 50.9% 48.9% 0.3% 364 
Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 49.4% 50.1% 0.5% 1000 
Kosovo Male 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 49.4% 48.9% 1.7% 816 
Female 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 68.3% 31.7% 0.0% 197 
Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 54.5% 44.2% 1.3% 1013 
Montenegro Male 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 77.9% 21.5% 0.6% 512 
Female 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 84.8% 13.2% 2.0% 529 
Total 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 80.9% 18.0% 1.2% 1041 
EU15* Male 79.8% 18.7% 1.5% 7499 81.2% 16.7% 2.1% 11253 
Female 86.2% 12.1% 1.7% 7433 86.3% 11.3% 2.4% 11122 
Total 82.6% 15.8% 1.6% 14932 83.5% 14.3% 2.2% 22375 
EU27** Male 78.8% 19.4% 1.9% 12480 79.6% 17.7% 2.7% 17444 
Female 85.3% 12.7% 2.0% 13088 85.2% 11.9% 2.8% 17871 
Total 81.7% 16.4% 1.9% 25568 82.1% 15.1% 2.8% 35315 
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Montenegro, there the share of workers employed in this sector is even higher than in 
Kosovo*, the figures being about 30 per cent and 25 per cent respectively.
9
 
Even prior to the crisis, the labour market seemed to be less stable in the region than 
among the current EU members: according to the European Quality of Life Survey conducted 
in 2007, the share respondents reporting no job security was higher in all the three countries 
examined than in either the Central and Eastern European members (11 per cent) or the EU as 
a whole (9 per cent).
10
 In Croatia this figure stood at 13 per cent, whereas in Macedonia* it 
was very high at 34 per cent, and in Turkey 15 per cent. 
                                                          
9
 Eurofound, Labour Mobility within the EU, 2012. 
10
 Eurofound, Quality of life in Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey 2011., p. 84.   
18 
 
CHAPTER 4 – RECENT MIGRATION TRENDS FROM THE REGION: KEY 
DESTINATION COUNTRIES  
As is well known, the countries of the region have a recent emigration history, which could 
influence the future labour market in an enlarged economic area. Therefore, it is worth 
presenting a brief overview, identifying the key destination countries and trends in the stock 
of migrants over the past several years.  
In terms of absolute numbers, the key destination country remained Germany, where 
the number of people born in Turkey was close to 1.5 million in 2009. The second largest 
country of origin from the region was Croatia: the stock of those born in this country was 
almost 250,000, and the number of people born in Serbia and Montenegro was also 
substantial, reaching 209,000. The number of emigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina who 
lived in Germany was 176,000 in the same year. Although in general inflow to Germany has 
recently declined, asylum seekers from Serbia have increased recently, becoming the third 
most important group among asylum seekers: “their number increased almost eight-fold in 
2010.”11 
The second most important destination country is Austria, although here the number 
of Turkish-born citizens was lower in 2007 than those living either in France or in the 
Netherlands (155,900, 243,400 and 194,800, respectively). As is known, Austria is also a 
major destination country for citizens from the successor states of former Yugoslavia. In 
addition, the inflow from some of them has recently increased. The number of people 
originating from Serbia and Montenegro actually exceeded even the number of Turks, being 
187,900 in 2009 (as against 159,000 Turks). The number of those who were born in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, but living now in Austria is also high: 133,500
12
. Unlike in Germany, the 
inflow increased over the past couple of years: “Taken together, the successor countries of 
the former Yugoslavia accounted for 11% of new immigrants.”13 
As regards other destination countries, Greece was definitely very important for 
Albanian immigrants, at least in 2001, when not less than 403,900 people born in Albania 
lived in the country (unfortunately, more recent data is not available). 
Among the EU15 countries there are some where the number of citizens from the 
former Yugoslav republics is large (for example, in Sweden, 71,600, in the Netherlands 
52,800 in the year 2009). Their share of the foreign population, however, is the largest in 
                                                          
11
 OECD, International Migration Outlook 2011 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011), 282. 
12
 Ibid., 2009 data  
13
 Ibid., 262. 
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Slovenia, where they constituted 88 per cent of foreign citizens at the beginning of 2010. The 
share of migrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina alone is not less than 47 per cent.
14
 The 
shares of the other countries are as follows: Macedonia* 11 per cent, Serbia 11 per cent and 
Croatia 9 per cent. “Most immigration is temporary labour migration, in particular for 
construction. The vast majority of the corresponding work permits which are issued to 
migrants are tied to a specific employer.”15 The dominance of workers from the region is 
obviously related partly to traditional ties, but partly also to a recent policy (in the wake of 
the crisis) setting up quotas, 95 per cent of which are reserved for nationals of the former 
republics of Yugoslavia.
16
 Hungary is another EU member state which is geographically very 
close, and where a relatively large population born in the former Yugoslavia lives. In 2009 
their number was 33,700.
17
 Many of them are ethnic Hungarians. In terms of the number, a 
similar size of population originating from Serbia and Montenegro lived in Belgium (34,200) 
in 2007. Belgium was also a host country for 89,000 people who were born in Turkey in the 
same year.
18
 
                                                          
14
 Their inflow increased in recent years, especially from 2007, when it grew to 12,500 (from 7,900 in the 
previous year). In 2008 the inflow was 13,000 and despite the crisis it remained basically at the same level in 
2009, when it was 12,900. It may well be that this is related to the negotiations Slovenia conducted on bilateral 
agreements with Bosnia and Herzegovina. “Although this has not been signed, there are protocols in place that 
are based on mutual cooperation between employment agencies” (OECD, International Migration Outlook, 
320), and one of them was signed in 2007 (OECD, 2011). 
15
 OECD, International Migration Outlook, 320. 
16
 For details see: OECD, 320. 
17
 Ibid., 391. National data: Register of holders of permanent residence cards, Office of Immigration and 
Nationality. Ministry of Administration and Justice. 
18
 2007 for both data. Ibid., 387. National data: Population Register Directorate General Statistics and Economic 
Information (DGSEI) 
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CHAPTER 5 – EXPERIENCES OF THE LAST WAVES OF ENLARGEMENTS: IMPACT 
OF LABOUR MOBILITY 
 
It seems particularly relevant to examine these experiences, since the initial fears regarding a 
high inflow from would-be members to some of the potential destination countries (EU15) 
will most likely reappear during the next rounds of enlargement. As is well known, these 
fears led to the seven-year transition period, when restrictions on the free movement of 
persons were introduced. There were some member states (the UK, Ireland and Sweden), 
however, which opened their labour market right after the accession of the eight countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, in 2004. A large inflow to the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland 
as a consequence can clearly be seen from Table 3.7. In those countries the growth was much 
more pronounced than elsewhere. As can be seen, between 2005 and 2007 the numbers of 
new EU citizens doubled in the case of these two host countries. The impact of the crisis, 
however, is also strong – in Ireland, which is one of the countries hardest hit by the economic 
recession, the number of foreign residents declined between 2008 and 2010, from 211,000 to 
180,000. Despite the decrease, however, citizens of the EU10 remained the largest group of 
foreign nationals living in Ireland (vis-à-vis those of EU15 and third country nationals, 
respectively). At the same time, it should be noted that, not surprisingly, the crisis adversely 
affected job opportunities not only for the native population, but also for the mobile workers 
in Ireland. 
The situation is different with the EU2 (i.e. Bulgaria and Romania), related obviously 
to their later entry. The crisis, however, does not seem to have had an effect on the inflow of 
their citizens to the major destination countries (although it may well be that without the 
crisis, their number would be even higher). As regards the increase in their number in Spain 
in 2009 and 2010, this is understandable in view of the fact that Spain granted free access to 
Bulgarian and Romanian nationals in January 2009 (which, as is known, was withdrawn from 
Romanians in the summer of 2011, Spain referring to serious labour market disturbances). At 
first sight, however, it is not easy to explain why the number of EU2 residents increased in 
Italy, which applied restrictions, even if with simplifications (as it still does). This question is 
all the more relevant since Italy was also severely hit by the recession. There are two 
plausible explanations for this: one is that the increase reflects the regularisation of illegal 
Bulgarian and Romanian migrants having already stayed in these countries before the 
accession (similarly to the case of the EU10 citizens in Germany and Austria). The other is 
21 
 
that the inflow, especially in Italy, is highly demand-driven, i.e. there are some sectors and 
occupations which are characterised by significant labour shortages, and therefore the EU2 
citizens are in high demand in certain specific segments of the labour market, for example in 
the health and care sector. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that the employment rate 
of EU2 workers declined to a lower extent than in Spain.
19
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 Klára Fóti, “Mobility in Europe since the Eastern enlargement: emergence of a European labour market?,” in: 
Eastern Journal of European Studies, Vol 2, Issue2, December 2011. , pp. 93-107 
http://ejes.uaic.ro/articles/EJES2011_0202_FOT.pdf (accessed: 27
th
 of February, 2014) 
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Table 5.1: Number of foreign residents from the member states of the recent two waves of enlargement in key host countries, by EU10 and EU2 citizens, 
2005-2010 (thousand). 
 
Sources: Eurostat, EU LFS, Eurostat population statistics, national data sources, European Commission Directorate-General Employment  
…: too small, or not reliable. *Eurostat population statistics. **2005: CSO estimates, 2006-2010: EU LFS quarterly data, 4th quarter. ***EU LFS quarterly data, 
4
th
 quarter
 
Host country EU10 member states EU2 member states  
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Change 
2005/10 
(%) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Change, 
2005/2010 
(%) 
Germany
*
 483 564 596 605 616 605 25.3 112 120 141 158 178 206 83.9 
Ireland
**
 100 161 211 211 183 180 80.0 … 13 18 18 19 14 7.7 
Spain* 71 103 127 137 140 137 93.0 490 664 890 964 991 1,006 105.3 
Italy* 81 95 118 130 138 153 88.9 315 362 659 837 934 1,069 239.4 
Austria* 75 81 87 94 97 105 40.0 28 28 35 41 45 46 64.3 
UK
***
 293 503 691 728 720 945 222.5 29 35 40 74 90 124 327.6 
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In sum, although large inflows followed both waves of enlargement to certain 
countries (involving citizens from certain Central and Eastern European new member states), 
at the European level this did not mean a substantial increase: the proportion of EU citizens 
of working age (15-64) living in an EU country other than their own increased by 0.8 of a 
percentage point between 2004 and 2010 (from 2 per cent to 2.8 per cent). In addition, it 
appears that both prior to and after the crisis the inflow of workers was mainly demand-
driven (see the examples of Ireland and Italy as host countries). 
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CHAPTER 6 – CONCLUSION 
 
Although there are many political and economic challenges the Western Balkans countries 
should face in the coming years, today it seems that in many respects lessons drawn from the 
previous two waves of Eastern enlargement could be relevant. Even if in the case of Turkey 
the scale of previous migration flows cannot be compared, in some other aspects the EU will 
have to deal with similar challenges as it did during the most recent enlargement. 
For example, apart from Turkey and Kosovo*, the demographic developments in the 
Western Balkans in many ways show similar characteristics as was the case of Central and 
Eastern Europe. It is also within the context of demographic trends that a quite direct lesson 
can be learnt. Between 2000 and 2011 the EU15 population between 0 and 14 years 
decreased by 1 per cent, in the Central and Eastern European members it declined by almost 
25 per cent, whereas in the Western Balkans countries the decrease was somewhat lower. 
“The average population decrease in the NMS-1020 almost doubled over the past decade, 
compared to the period 1989-2000. About half of the reduction from 2000-2011 is due to net 
emigration from the region, while the other half stems from a natural decrease in the 
population, with birth rates consistently lower than death rates. In the Western Balkans 
countries, the population figure remained almost stable and increased by about 10% in 
Turkey.”21 As a consequence of enlargement and the free movement of labour, this will 
definitely change: the population is also expected to decline in the Western Balkans countries 
much more rapidly than today, and this will also derive from two sources: natural decrease 
and net emigration to the current EU member states. This, however, will not happen in 
Turkey, although its development path also points in this direction, albeit over a much longer 
term. 
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 It stands for the 10 Central and Eastern European countries which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, 
respectively, i.e. Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania Slovakia and 
Slovenia.  
21
 Astrov et al. New Divide(s) in Europe, 52. 
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